Why Did Russia Sell Out Armenia – Inability or Unwillingness?
Geopolitical Realignment in the Near Abroad
Dear Subscribers,
“Barbershop Whispers….Russia” begins with “My Takeaways”on the main topic followed by the main topic discussion. The last two sections of “Barbershop Whispers…Russia” will be follow-ups from previous publications and emerging events.
In the previous issue, I discussed the competition for influence over Central Asia and the Caucasus and the use of government organizations created by Russia and others to project influence in Russia’s “Near Abroad”.
This week’s issue focuses on Russia’s decision to abandon its security commitments to Armenia, ultimately contributing to Azerbaijan’s successful takeover of the long-disputed ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh – the Republic of Artsakh. Why did Russia not fulfill its security commitment to Armenia? Was it inability or unwillingness?
My Takeaways:
REALIGNMENT: Putin's war on Ukraine is forcing him to reassess Russia's regional alliances; Azerbaijan is more valuable than Armenia, given the constraints Western sanctions have placed on Russia and its trading partners;
UNRELIABLE: Russia's decision to abandon its security commitments to Armenia, again demonstrates Russia to be an unreliable partner. This reputation continues to impact commitments by member states to the Russia-led organizations Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO);
REPUTATIONAL PRICE: The price for defaulting on the security commitments to Armenia are high. This action degrades the integrity of any Russian led institution and brings into question the value and ability of the institution to deliver on its commitments. Putin has determined the price is worth the return;
Regional History and Modern Wars
Regional History
The Caucasus has been subject to centuries of imperial rule and collapse. The Persian, Ottoman, and Russian empires have come and gone, leaving a rich tapestry of cultures and languages in the region. After the Soviet Union re-established control over the collapsed Russian Empire, three Soviet republics were created out of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in 1936 – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. In this process, the historical Armenian enclave of Karabakh was given the status as an Autonomous Oblast inside the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. For decades under Soviet control, the ethnic tensions in the South Caucasus were managed through strong control at the federal level, similar to how Josip Tito managed Yugoslavia. Interesting similarities between Kosovo and Karabakh are that both were structured as autonomous provinces, not republics, and based on ethnic populations.
(Source: The Economist)
First Nagorno-Karabakh War
Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, conflicts broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast parliament’s 1988 vote to unite with Armenia. These conflicts continued in the region until a full-scale war broke out over control of the region in 1992 between Armenia and Azerbaijan. During the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, historically Azeri territory was captured by Armenia to create a buffer between Azerbaijan and the enclave. Massacres occurred, and accusations of ethnic cleansing were exchanged, in 1988 (Sumgait) and 1992 (Khojaly). In 1994 Russia brokered a ceasefire between the warring countries, and the internationally unrecognized Republic of Artsakh was established to govern the Armenian majority enclave. Two key components of the ceasefire were Armenian control over the three-mile wide Lachin corridor connecting Artsakh with the Armenian homeland and an implicit Russian security arrangement for Armenia.
Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Despite sporadic fighting, the 1994 ceasefire held for nearly three decades, and as negotiations continued, Armenia and Russia formalized a security arrangement, and Azerbaijan developed closer ties with Türkiye. In late 2020 Azerbaijan, with Turkish support, launched a successful offensive to take back Azeri territory under Armenian control since 1994. A ceasefire was again brokered by Russia. This agreement included 2,000 Russian peacekeepers intended to enforce the peace.
The Republic of Artsakh Falls to Azeri Armed Forces
After 31 years of self-rule and reliance on Russian security guarantees, the Republic of Artsakh fell to Azeri forces this week in less than 24 hours. Over the last 12 months, tension between the two countries has steadily ramped up. On 19 September, Azerbaijan launched a full-scale attack on Nagorno-Karabakh under the pretext of constitutional order and anti-terrorist operations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has called it an ethnic cleansing campaign against Karabakh.
The attack resulted in the surrender of separatist forces and the Artsakh government’s commitment to negotiate integration into Azerbaijan. Days later after taking control of Artsakh, Azerbaijan lifted the blockade on the Lachin corridor that had been in place for nearly 10 months, reopening the only link between the region and Armenia proper.
(Source: AP)
As of this writing, the United Nations estimates 88,000 people have fled the region, out of a population 120,000.
(Source: The Armenian Mirror Spectator)
As part of the Azeri operation to take control of the region, they have arrested Arksakh leaders and transporting them to Baku for prosecution. The most prominent of these officials to be detained and arrested is Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire who renounced his Russian citizenship in September 2022. Vardanyan was detained as he tried to cross the Lachin corridor. According to Russian senator Alexander Bashkin, Vardanyan will not receive help from Russia:
“It is noted that at the end of last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin granted Vardanyan’s application to renounce his Russian citizenship… Renunciation of citizenship was a voluntary choice, therefore all the legal consequences of this step are a consequence of his choice. I think that voluntary renunciation of citizenship will have legal consequences, because now he cannot and will not receive help from the Russian Federation.”
Ruben Vardanyan is a well known and respected entrepreneur with decades of successful businesses in Russia and Armenia.
Where is Russian Support for Armenia? Are We Seeing Inability or Unwillingness?
With Russian troops committed to Putin’s war in Ukraine, the Kremlin does not have the bandwidth to intervene and fulfill its security commitments to Armenia, either as stipulated by the peacekeeping arrangement under the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement or under Article 4 of the CSTO. Moreover, Russia’s growing economic dependence on Türkiye— an ally of Azerbaijan — requires it to temper its response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For example, Russia relies on the export of crude oil and grains through the Turkish-controlled Bosporus. Finally, over the past decade Azerbaijan has become more independent from Russia, thanks to its increased energy exports to global markets. With this expanding global presence comes a legal responsibility to abide by western standards, such as trade relations with sanctioned countries. For example, in 2018 Azerbaijan declined participation in the International North-South Transport Corridor, a railroad project with Iran that runs through a critical part of Azerbaijan, for fear of consequences of investing with Iran, a sanctioned country. However, as of May 2023, Russia and Iran agreed to jointly finance the railroad project that runs through Azerbaijan, which would connect Russia with Persian and Indian Ocean ports. Participation gives Russia a stake in this trade c trade corridors play an important role in Putin’s decision to abandon Armenia.
(Azeri President Aliyev and Turkish President Erdoğan in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, EPA Photo)
These are just a few tangible drivers forcing Putin to rethink Russia’s position and strategic alliances in the region. This realignment comes at the expense of Russia’s formal security commitments and promises made to regional allies, such as the CSTO (which, by the way, Azerbaijan is not a member of).
An important intangible variable is the personal relationship between Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Since Pashinyan’s election in 2018, relations between the two have been lukewarm at best. And Pashinyan has taken stronger steps recently to distance Armenia from Russia, such as refusing to participate in, and host, the 2023 CSTO military exercises (Unbreakable Brotherhood), hosting joint US-Armenian military exercises this year, and announcing that Armenia will join the International Criminal Court (ICC) at a time that the ICC has an active international warrant for Putin’s arrest. Prior to these recent actions, one must consider how Pashinyan came to power. He is the product of the Velvet Revolution that ousted a presidential incumbent accused of massive corruption and who was close to the Kremlin. Pashinyan the democrat, in the eyes of Putin, is not as a trustworthy partner, as Azeri President Aliyev.
Putin’s inability and unwillingness to fulfill the security commitments made to Armenia are driven by the changing geopolitical landscape, in the region and globally, caused by Putin’s war on Ukraine. Russia’s armed forces are stretched beyond capacity, trade routes and settlement process have been disrupted by sanctions, and therefore the value of alliances must be reassessed.
Follow-ups & Quick Bites:
Follow-Ups:
Former Wagner Commander Oversees Volunteer Fighters In Ukraine
Wagner commander Andrei Troshev, AKA "Sedoi" (Gray-haired), met with Putin and Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and stressed the integration of Wagner mercenaries into Russia's regular army. Sedoi will oversee detachment of volunteers in Ukraine.
( Putin, Yevkurov, and Troshev: Source: Kremlin.ru)
Quick Bites:
Kazakhstan Won’t Help Russia Bust Sanctions
President Tokayev of Kazakhstan announced at a press conference in Berlin, following talks with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin, that Kazakhstan would comply with western sanctions against Russia.
"We have clearly stated that we will respect the sanctions and that we are in contact with the relevant organisations to comply with the sanctions regime….And I believe that there should be no concern about possible actions aimed at circumventing the sanctions regime."
(Source: The Moscow Times)
While no doubt the statement is made with sincerity, the reality is weak western enforcement of sanctions and the lucrative returns generated from these activities, particularly for a country bordering Russia, will result in some level of sanctions violation. How much, will be a function of both western and Kazakh bureaucratic tolerance and acceptance for such violations.
Vol 1, No 13 - BWR 01.10.2023
Thank you for reading “Barbershop Whispers....Russia” written by Adam A Blanco! “Barbershop Whispers…Russia” is a product of e8Q Technologies, a consultancy with insights on all things Eurasia. Subscribe for free to receive new posts.