Venezuelan Missile Crisis – A Kremlin Problem
Another Drug Cartel | A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed | A Plane for Maduro
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In last week’s BWR, I discussed the new package of US and EU sanctions. Will the Russian economy survive the new sanctions tidal wave? How will Russia’s biggest buyers of Russian crude oil, China and India, respond? Who will control EU energy supplies?
In this week’s BWR, I will discuss Venezuela’s desperate cry for help to Russia, China, and Iran as Uncle Sam assembles the largest flotilla in the Caribbean since the invasion of Grenada. How does this impact Russia’s global influence?
Takeaways
BROTHERS IN ARMS—Anti-Western ideology soothes the soul, but it is not a substitute for hard currency in exchange for weapons and influence needed for the Ukrainian front, the collapsing Shia crescent, and the invasion of Taiwan.
GLOBAL INFLUENCE—The Kremlin faces further loss of its global influence. The potential fall of Maduro could trigger regime change in Cuba, a Cold War Soviet relic. This, along with the fall of Putin’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, raises the question of the Russian value proposition of alignment - no bueno.
REALPOLITIK—Strikes targeting alleged Venezuelan drug smuggling speedboats are likely to escalate into attacks on Venezuelan military installations and a drone facility run jointly with Iran. Why? Because Uncle Sam can. He will assert his dominance over his ‘near abroad’.
Another ‘Drug Cartel’
“Like Rip van Winkle, Uncle Sam has awoken from his decades-long sleep to find a changed world in his backyard: Latin America and the Caribbean. During his sleep, Russia and China have been very active, reviving old relationships and establishing new ones on the political and economic fronts.”
In January this year, I wrote about Uncle Sam’s renewed interest—after decades of neglect—in its southern neighbors. As the Kremlin views Ukraine as its ‘near abroad,’ the Trump administration is reviving the Monroe Doctrine and considers Venezuela, Cuba, and the rest of Latin America as its ‘near abroad.’ China is also asserting its own ‘near abroad’ foreign policy, especially regarding Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist holdout, Taiwan, and is pushing the boundaries of international acceptability as it challenges the Western-dominated global power structure. These are foreign policy concepts—Russia’s Near Abroad and the US Monroe Doctrine—that can be traced to Otto von Bismarck’s realpolitik principles of pragmatism over idealism (Divide up the World – Leave Values at the Door), spheres of influence, power projection, and regional dominance.
In 2025, the Trump administration designated the Venezuelan ‘Cartel de los Soles’ as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization, after which several Latin American countries followed suit—Argentina, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Ecuador. This US action was followed by increasing the arrest bounty on de facto Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from $25 million to $50 million because he is the alleged head of the cartel. However, Brazil, the region’s largest economy, has taken a different approach to isolating Maduro. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva never officially recognized Maduro’s presidency, citing election fraud in 2024, and was, in fact, responsible for Venezuela not being accepted into BRICS in 2024 when Russian President Putin proposed Venezuela as a new member. Lula da Silva’s opposition to the US SDGT designation of Venezuela stems from the understanding that it implies the legal option of military action by the US against Venezuela, and he is not mistaken in this conclusion. The US history of intervention in Latin America is not lost on South American and Caribbean leaders, e.g., Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, etc.
The SDGT designation is the final step in a series of measures taken by the Trump Administration since January that effectively labels Venezuela as a narco-state. This grants the Trump administration ‘legal’ authority to respond to actions or targets in Venezuela that it considers to be terrorist threats to the US. For example, missile strikes on speedboats in international waters near Venezuela have been carried out multiple times, claiming they are drug smugglers with goods destined for the US.
It is worth noting, as I wrote in the 31 Aug 2025 BWR publication, that Venezuela also hosts a significant Venezuelan-Iranian drone manufacturing plant located at the El Libertador Air Base, about 110 km from Caracas. Although the plant is technically owned by the Venezuelan state-owned defense manufacturer Compañía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias (CAVIM), the operator is Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated Qods Aviation Industries, which supplies materials and training, an SDGT entity. In addition to the drone factory, Russian state-owned Rosobornexport, completed the construction of an ammunition factory in Venezuela that manufactures the widely used 7.62mm cartridges. The plant manufactures up to 70 million cartridges annually. This site already hosts a separate Kalashnikov rifle assembly plant that began operations in 2012 to produce AK-103 and AK-104 assault rifles under Russian license.
A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed – It Depends
Over the past six weeks, Uncle Sam has assembled the largest naval flotilla in the Caribbean off Venezuela’s coast since the 1983 Grenada invasion. As the show of force intensifies with US military lethal action, Maduro has been frantically writing pleading letters for help to Russian President Putin, Chinese President Xi, and Iranian President Pezeshkian. According to The Washington Post (WP), Maduro requested assistance from Putin in restoring Russian fighter aircraft, radar systems, and securing loans to purchase new equipment from Rostec. In his letter to President Xi, Maduro framed US military action against Venezuela as,
‘…an action against China due to our shared ideology...’
Putin and Xi’s priorities have shifted over the past few years, and Maduro has not adapted to these changes. Russia is focusing all its resources on the war in Ukraine, while China is reassessing its immediate needs at home and reviewing its Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) portfolio. Venezuela was once the largest recipient of BRI loans in South America, reaching $60 billion at one point, but the financial and political returns for China in Venezuela have been mediocre at best. After multiple loan restructurings since 2010, Venezuela still owes China about $13 billion. Russia’s economic interests in Venezuela have also decreased. Russia’s state oil company Roszarubezhneft owns 9.6% of the Venezuelan state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A (PDVSA), the country’s main revenue source, but has little else invested in Venezuela. Although Russia and Venezuela signed another cooperation agreement in October 2025, it is more performative than substantive. Unlike the cooperation agreement with North Korea, it does not include an explicit security pact.
A Plane for Maduro
Venezuela is in need, but so are its friends – Putin, Xi, and Pezeshkian are not in a position to help their brother-in-arms, Maduro. The best that Putin can do for Maduro is send a plane to collect him to Moscow and share a flat with Bashar al-Assad.
Venezuela, much like Syria did in many aspects, serves as a symbol of the Kremlin’s global influence. However, supporting Venezuela comes with high costs, especially as all of the Kremlin’s resources are diverted to Putin’s war in Ukraine. Although both the Kremlin and Miraflores share contempt for the US-led Western global order, neither has the financial or global resources needed to effectively oppose it, and Chinese President Xi has other priorities – Venezuela is not one of them. As for Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s Shia Crescent stretching to the Levant is no longer, and it is effectively defenseless against Israel and the US.
It is worth noting that the fall of the Maduro regime could quickly lead to regime change in Cuba, marking a significant shift in the global order and the Kremlin’s relationship with the ‘global south.” Cuba, a topic that warrants a BWR publication as it relates to Russia, remains an unreformed Soviet relic from the Cold War era, with intelligence services—arguably the best in the world—closely tied to the Kremlin and Venezuela, while its economy has effectively collapsed. For example, according to a presentation recently delivered by Dr. William Messina at the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), Cuba’s 2024/25 sugar production is the lowest in almost 200 years – Sin Azúcar, no hay Pais. Cuba is now importing sugar.
Additional Reading(s)
The Spirit of Monroe and Sanctioned Oil (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 31 Aug 2025)
The New Great Game – Russia and China Battle the U.S. for Influence and Resources in Latin America (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 26 Jan 2025)
Dividing Up the World - Leave Values at the Door (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 03 Mar 2025)
Iran Increases Presence in Venezuela with Drone Plant (Latin Times, 10 Jan 2025)
Why Washington Targets Venezuela and Iran: Empire, Energy, and Ideology ( Venezuela Analysis, 25 Jun 2025)
Brazil Reiterates that it Does Not Recognize the Maduro Regime (CiberCuba, 27 Aug 2025)
Follow-ups & Quick Bites
Follow-ups
Indian Oil Corp (IOC) Resumes Purchases of Russian Crude Oil
Despite US threats of secondary sanctions against the buyers of Russian oil, in particular India, IOC has resumed importing Russian crude oil.
According to Reuters, IOC purchased five shipments of Russian oil for delivery in December 2025 from unsanctioned suppliers. The purchases follow Indian refiners' pause in purchases after the US levied sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil last week. The U.S. Treasury has given global buyers until November 21, 2025, to wind down their business with Rosneft and Lukoil.
Additional Readings
Who Blinks First - the Sanctions War (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 26 Oct 2025)
Quick Bites
There are no Quick Bites this week.
Vol 3, No 45 - BWR 02.11.2025
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