What Happened & Why? Continuation of the End of the Putin Regime
Putin and his trusted Soviet-era loyalists, mostly comprising intelligence service members, temporarily lost control over Yevgeny Prigozhin, the nationalist mercenary leader of the Wagner Group (a private military company, or PMC) and a creature of Putin’s own making. Wagner is the PMC most actively deployed by the Putin regime and serves to fulfill Russian foreign policy objectives abroad while maintaining plausible deniability. In addition to operating in Ukraine, Wagner is active in Africa and the Middle East, specifically Syria. These mercenary deployments, including the one in Ukraine, generate billions of dollars paid to Wagner by Russian and foreign governments.
(Pictures of Prigozhin in various disguises as released by the Kremlin)
Why did Prigozhin "revolt"? It was driven by his pursuit of money and power. Several weeks ago, the Ministry of Defense announced that all Russian PMCs would be required to sign contracts with the ministry and fall under its command. Wagner PMC, led by Prigozhin, was the only PMC to refuse, and Prigozhin learned from sympathizers within the ministry that there were secret plans to dismantle Wagner PMC. Such action would significantly reduce Prigozhin's power and revenue.
For several months now, Prigozhin has publicly criticized Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and First Deputy Defense Minister Valery Gerasimov for their poor management of the war, withholding materiel from Wagner, and engaging in outright corruption that has resulted in the deaths of thousands of soldiers. Prigozhin’s most recent public verbal attack, coming as he "took over" the Rostov military base and administration buildings while the ministers fled Rostov, accused them of waging an unwarranted war on Ukraine for their own selfish interests and claimed that the Ukrainian army had never posed a threat to Russia. Prigozhin stated his ranting video:
"The Armed Forces of Ukraine were not going to attack Russia with NATO... The war was needed for a bunch of scumbags to triumph and show how strong of an army they are."
This deviation from the regime's official justification for the launch of the second invasion in February 2022 – a claim that Ukraine, together with NATO, posed an existential threat to Russia – is a dangerous and infectious challenge to the Putin narrative. The danger is amplified by the fact that this challenge is coming from a nationalist figure with a strong nationalist following, as well as the only military leader who has achieved any measure of "success" (such as in Bakhmut) since the start of the second invasion. It is infectious because, as the low morale of Russian troops suggests, many are already questioning the justification for the war, resulting in a lack of desire to fight. Russian soldiers complain about the insufficient supply of proper equipment, including materiel, clothing, and food, as well as intelligence.
An important observation is the Ministry of Defense's inaction during the takeover of the Rostov airbase and Wagner's "March of Justice" to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. Two helicopters, an airplane, and a roadblock were destroyed, resulting in the deaths of 11 Russian soldiers, but there was little resistance otherwise. In fact, Prigozhin can be seen in a video casually conversing with Vladimir Alekseyev (deputy director of GRU - Foreign Military Intelligence), and Yunus-bek Yevkurov (deputy defense minister) as if nothing is amiss.
What Happens Next? Stalinist Purges a New Front
During a recent televised speech in which Putin denounced Prigohzin and participating Wagner soldiers as traitors, Russia’s president noted that the PMC was paid RUB 86 billion (around USD 1 billion) last year for its involvement in Ukraine. Putin went on to say, “We hope none of these Wagner funds were misappropriated or stolen,” opening the door for an investigation into Wagner's finances. Such concerns are typically stored in a "kompromat" folder for future use, a regime practice customary for all Russian citizens.
A purge of the Ministry of Defense has started to identify and remove sympathizers of Wagner and those who question the justification for the war. This purge will follow the Stalinist model, starting from the top. General Sergei Surovikin (sometimes called “General Armageddon”) was detained for questioning after the revolt and he has not been seen in public since. It is believed that he had prior knowledge of the revolt and is known to be a close associate and the go-to person in the Ministry of Defense for Wagner. Prigozhin is allegedly in Belarus at the invitation of "President" Alexander Lukashenko, who is portrayed as the peacemaker of the revolt. Prigozhin's Russian-based media group has been shut down, and Wagner mercenaries who did not participate in the revolt are being offered contracts with the Russian armed forces.
Putin must now contend with war on three fronts:
1. Ukrainian Army: Ukrainian soldiers are fighting with great determination, motivated by their desire to protect their families, homes, and dignity. They have been trained by Western military forces since 2014, shortly after the first invasion, and have continuous access to sophisticated Western weapons. It will be a challenge for Russia to retain the occupied territories dating back to 2014, especially considering the professionalism of the Ukraine armed forces in defending their country and the low morale of Russian soldiers.
2. Domestic Nationalists: There is growing demand for Putin to intensify the prosecution of the war. This would require additional mobilization of conscripts and more supplies. However, both demands are challenging to fulfill, as a new mobilization would result in more casualties, bring the war closer to the homes of Russian families, and further divert resources from the rest of Russia’s economy. Furthermore, Russia has already depleted a significant portion of its supplies, including ammunition and equipment. Replenishing these supplies requires labor and money, both of which are strained due to youth emigration and Western sanctions that impact the economy.
3. Domestic Opposition: Jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny has launched a new anti-war campaign from behind bars. The campaign will utilize call centers located outside the country and social media platforms to disseminate the anti-war message during the upcoming presidential election. The campaign explicitly names "War" and Putin as the presidential candidates.
There is little evidence of a broad active anti-war constituency in Russia. However, as the war comes closer to home in the form of more young dead soldiers from the front, likely new mobilization of conscripts, and drone attacks on Russia proper – four new drone attacks on Moscow on 4 July – increases the possibility civil unrest, led by wives and mothers against the aging regime.
Impact on Putin's Power
The revolt has weakened Putin's grip on power on many levels, most importantly it has brought into question his control over the armed forces and the narrative of the war.
The security services will intensify purges, not only within the military but also throughout the bureaucracy and civil society. The purge within the Ministry of Defense has already begun, targeting Prigozhin sympathizers. This will intensify the distrust within the ranks of the armed forces and impact performance on the battlefield.
Putin will shape the media narrative to highlight the existential threat posed by Western influence in the "revolt." This narrative has already been hinted at by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. While Putin controls the tradition media outlets, he does not control the Telegram and other social media channels operated by many nationalists who want the removal of the defense minister and more resources deployed to prosecuting the war. He does not control the news source of the younger generations – 18 to 45 -- who use VPN to access news from abroad.
The revolt has also weakened the aging gerontocracy by demonstrating that Putin can be directly challenged without consequences. Eleven Russian service men died at the hands of Wagner mercenaries, yet Prigozhin was allowed to take refuge in Belarus transported in his private jet. Prigozhin also publicly challenged the existential threat to the motherland narrative as justification for the war and instead accused the defense ministers of fabricating this narrative for their own greedy profiteering interests. The lack of accountability for the deaths of Russian soldiers will further impact troop morale and the corruption accusation resonates with Russian soldiers and their families. This makes Putin look weak and not in control.
Putin’s control over the armed services is shallow and superficial. Under the surface, there is infighting, and rivalry among the bloated ranks and generals and various services. Decades of corruption by incompetent generals have manifest themselves in the debacle of Putin’s failed war in Ukraine. From Tsarist times to Soviet times, defeat on the battlefield due to incompetence and corruption has resulted in power change at the top: the Russo-Japanese war, World War 1, and the Afghan war are examples.
The revolt also impacts Putin’s standing overseas: Putin’s most important global ally, Chairman Xi Jinping, is certainly watching events closely.
How and when will the Putin regime change? Who will replace Putin? These are important questions to be addressed in the next issue of Barbershop Whispers….from Russia.
Takeaways
Putin’s grip on power continues to weaken and the war accelerates this process.
Putin has set up the Ministry of Defense as the scapegoat for the war failure.
Russian military inaction during the revolt indicates presidential indecisiveness and possibly division within the armed forces.
Beneficiaries of the revolt are Ukraine, Lukashenko, Navalny et al, and Prigozhin. However, Prigozhin’s time among the living will be short lived.
The Federal Security Service (FSB) continues to deliver bad intelligence without recourse.
Putin has lost control over the nationalist movement, a key support base for Putin.
Russia does not have the resources – materiel, soldiers, passion – to prosecute the war.
Hello Friends and Colleagues,
Thank you for reading the first publication of “Barbershop Whispers…Russia”.
I've received many requests for my thoughts on the developments in Russia, Putin's war, and most recently the Wagner Revolt. Given the volume of such requests over the past few months, I've decided to launch a weekly Substack brief on these events. These publications will cover Russian politics, business, the war and from time to time true stories - with unavoidable colorful embellishments - about my experiences in Russia.
These publications will also be driven by subscriber interests of current events in and about Russia. In this spirit I would be grateful for your thoughts and recommendations on topics of interest to you as well as feedback about the publication format.
Thank you,
Adam A Blanco
Vol 1, No 1 - BWR 05.07.2023
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