The Russia and Middle East Relationship: It’s Complicated
Russian Influence in the Middle East
Dear Subscribers,
“Barbershop Whispers….Russia” begins with “My Takeaways”on the main topic followed by the main topic discussion. The last two sections of “Barbershop Whispers…Russia” will be follow-ups from previous publications and emerging events.
In the previous issue, I discussed the proposed Russian defense budget as the background for a look at Russia’s struggling military-industrial complex, which supplies both Putin’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s traditional arms export markets.
In this week’s issue, I will explore Russia’s relationship with Israel, considering the recent murderous Hamas attack on Israel, as well as its relationship with Iran and the Arab world.
My Takeaways:
RUSSIAN INFLUENCE: Russia is, and continues to be, a minor player in Middle Eastern affairs. Its influence is compromised by, on one hand, Russia’s dependence on Iranian drones for Putin’s war in Ukraine, and on the other, a need to keep Israel neutral on that war, thereby withholding financial and matériel support for Ukraine;
MIDDLE EAST WAR: A drawn-out war that extends beyond Gaza’s borders is not in Russia’s interest. Moscow would be forced to take a position for or against Israel, and this will have consequences for Putin’s war on Ukraine.
Background
Moscow recognized the creation of the Israeli state in 1948, but then severed diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967 because it supported the Arab countries in the Six-Day War. Diplomatic relations with Israel were not restored until 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet period Moscow was a powerful economic and military supporter of the Palestinians and the Arab world against Israel, but when the Soviet Union collapsed, Moscow’s support for, and influence in, the Arab world weakened.
When Putin came to power in 2000, he sought to reassert Moscow’s influence in the Middle East and build a working relationship with Israel. With the Arab world, support and influence came in the Soviet tradition of weapons, soldiers, and political support. Moscow’s participation in OPEC+ beginning in 2016 gave them influence over crude oil prices and output. With Israel, the significant Soviet and Russia diaspora living in Israel plus Putin’s good personal relations with Benjamin Netanyahu form the foundations for good relations.
Israel
The bedrock of the Russian-Israeli relationship is the nearly 1.3M Russian speakers who have emigrated to Israel since the collapse of the Soviet Union. These people represent approximately 15% of the Israeli population and influence Israeli politics and business with Russia and other former Soviet states. It should be noted that Ukrainians also also emigrated to Israel for decades.
Many of the recent émigrés are highly skilled Russians, who have left Russia in protest against Putin’s war on Ukraine or to seek shelter from western sanctions. Russian billionaire and investor Mikhail Friedman is an example of the latter.
Another important element of the Russian-Israeli relationship is the good personal relationship that Putin and Netanyahu have built over their two decades in power. Netanyahu is the longest-serving prime minister (16 years in total) in the history of the Israeli state, while Putin has ruled Russia for the past 23 years. Israel’s neutral stance over Putin’s war on Ukraine and the absence of Israeli financial and matériel support to Ukraine are an illustration of the power of their relationship.
However, this relationship is now at risk. As of this writing, the Kremlin has yet to condemn Hamas for the recent and unprecedented mass murder of almost 1,500 innocent civilians in Israel that occurred last weekend. Putin’s first statement on the attack and ensuing war came four days after it occurred, during a press conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Sudani. Putin blamed the Gaza massacre on years of failed U.S. policy in the region.
"I think that many people will agree with me that this is a vivid example of the failure of United States policy in the Middle East….Washington monopolised efforts at forging peace and ignored the interests of Palestinians, including their need for their own independent Palestinian state.”
Meanwhile, U.S. President Biden and many heads of state around the world were publicly condemning the Hamas attacks and placing phone calls to Prime Minister Netanyahu to offer support.
Other Middle East Players:
Iran:
Russia’s relationship with Iran is transactional and a partnership of convenience at best. Centuries of mistrust have seen the Russian and Persian Empires competing for territory in the 19th century, and more recently the Soviets supplying weapons to Iraq during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. However, by the end of the decade the mullahs of Iran had successfully convinced the Soviets (and their successors) to work together for their mutual regional interests through a negotiated end to the Tajik civil war (1992-1997) and support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. These were successful interactions that benefited both countries.
Today’s primary common interest is contesting US global influence, particularly as it relates to western sanctions. Iran has decades of sanctions evasion experience, and this knowledge is being transferred to the Kremlin. But as Russia executes and exploits sanctions evasion strategies in the already limited permissive jurisdictions where this can be done, this gives rise to competition with Iran. This is particularly true of the crude oil market, where Russia and Iran now compete for buyers in the shadowy world of sanctions evaders.
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Russia also competes with Iran for influence in Syria. Moscow’s support of the Assad regime in Syria is an example of this competition. In exchange for supporting Assad, Putin has been able to reestablish a permanent naval base in the Mediterranean port city of Tartus — Russia’s only Mediterranean naval port. At the same time, Russia’s presence in Syria is a barrier to Iran’s long-time wish for a pan-Persian sphere of influence, stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean.
Moscow's continuing relationship with the Iranian-backed terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah is another example of influence competition in the region with Iran.
Arab World
Over the years Putin has developed a good relationship with the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) and this has contributed to the OPEC+ structure, which has provided Russia greater influence in global oil markets. This is a diplomatic success for Putin, given that the Saudis have mostly leaned toward the US in geopolitical matters. The Saudis have also been on the path towards normalizing relations with Israel, and this will have consequences on the power dynamics between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
At Moscow’s request, Arab League Chief Ahmed Aboul Gheit met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov last week in Moscow to discuss Gaza. In the meeting Lavrov expressed the need to provide for the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova later said:
"We regard the current large-scale escalation as another extremely dangerous manifestation of a vicious circle of violence resulting from chronic failure to comply with the corresponding resolutions of the UN and its Security Council and the blocking by the West of the work of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators made up of Russia, the United States, the EU and the UN…"
Nowhere in these statements, nor previous statements, has Moscow condemned the Gaza Massacre and this has been noted by both Hamas and Israel.
Conclusion:
Putin’s war on Ukraine has compromised Russia’s influence in the Middle East, where it was already a minor player. Russia needs to keep Iran onside, because it needs drones to fight the war in Ukraine. But it cannot afford to offend Israel, should that tip the country away from its carefully neutral position into providing support to Ukraine. By trying to keep everyone in the Middle East happy, Putin risks alienating everyone. As every Russian babushka will tell their grandchildren:
“One cannot sit on two chairs at the same time.”
Follow-ups & Quick Bites:
Follow-Ups:
Why Did Russia Sell Out Armenia – Inability or Unwillingness?
Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned a lawmakers of the possibility that Azerbaijan could soon invade Armenia.
During an interview with Azerbaijani Public TV, President President Ilham Aliyev stated:
‘The creation of the Zangezur corridor fully meets our national, historical and future interests. We will be implementing the Zangezur Corridor, whether Armenia wants it or not…If Armenia wants to, we will solve this issue more easily, if it does not, we will solve it by force.’
As discussed in the 1 October 2023 issue of BWR the fall of the Republic of Artsakh does not end the Armenian Azeri conflict.
Quick Bites:
Putin Signs Executive Order for Currency Controls
Putin signed an executive order forcing certain categories of export companies to sell their foreign currency revenues generated from export sales for Roubles. The decision will affect the chemical, grain, fuel, and metallurgical sectors as well as all other exporters. The regulation requires the companies to establish new staff positions for internal federal monitors that will oversee compliance with the new currency regulation.
Vol 1, No 15 - BWR 15.10.2023
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