The Kremlin May Benefit from Uncle Sam’s Global Peace Tour
US Peace Tour | Preserving Global Presence | No Time for Losers | Oil, Oil, & More Oil
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In last week’s BWR, I discussed the Kremlin’s response to the US pressure on Cuba. Given the demands of the Russo-Ukrainian war, does the Kremlin have the resources to keep its client states in the Americas?
In this week’s BWR, I discuss the US-Israeli military attack on Iran. Another Russian ally is undergoing a forced change. How is the Kremlin adapting, given its limited resources, to this attack on its ally? Is this an opportunity to review alliances?
Takeaways
Realpolitik—Uncle Sam’s global tour from Venezuela to Iran is an opportunity for the Kremlin to reassess its legacy alliances and shed dead-weight alliances.
Bandwidth—The Russo-Ukrainian War demonstrates the Kremlin’s resource limitations, leaving its legacy allies to fend for themselves. However, this is not necessarily a bad thing for Russia.
Economics—Russia will experience greater demand for its sanctioned oil, and the current $30/bbl discount may contract to $10/bbl.
Uncle Sam’s Peace Tour
Today, the US is the world’s most powerful economic and military power, and as it wields that power globally, it is reorganizing the world order to its own liking. It wields economic power through the fiat status of the US dollar (USD) and military power through a global network of military bases and alliances unmatched by any other country – including Russia and China combined. While its global alliances remain in place, the foundational glue has shifted from shared values to realpolitik. This realpolitik foreign policy extends to its rivals.
In January, the US removed the illegitimate Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, and this past week it launched a joint military attack with Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran. As of the date of publication, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is reported killed in the attack, along with seven senior military leaders, in the first hours of the attack.
Venezuela and Iran are Kremlin allies that have sought Kremlin assistance in their dealings with the US, but without success. Maduro is currently sitting in a Manhattan prison, and Khamenei has been sent to his maker in hell. Syria, another Kremlin ally that has fallen out of Russia’s orbit, largely thanks to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was an especially important loss because of the lease on the military seaport and airbase, which allowed Russia to project power in the Mediterranean and supply matériel for its operations in Africa. Under the new Syrian President, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, once an Al-Qaeda operative, Russia no longer has access to those bases. Syria has now been swayed into the Turkish and US orbit, lured by Turkish and US recognition of the new government and the lifting of US sanctions.
Preserving Global Presence
As the US forces a realignment in the world order, the Kremlin is consumed by the Russo-Ukrainian War and can do little to help its allies against the US, other than through public condemnation and protests in the US Security Council. The Kremlin’s public protests are designed to reassure its client states in the Global South that it remains a Great Power Protector, despite evidence that this position has greatly weakened.
Behind the scenes and in private, Putin has recognized that he is in a rare situation in which he shares a worldview with a US president who has prioritized normal relations between the US and Russia as equals. The US transformation from a sponsor of Ukraine in its fight for survival against Russia to an ‘honest’ peace broker in the war is a curious shift that Putin is exploiting to extract as much as possible. What does this mean? There are more concessions to be extracted in the peace negotiations than would otherwise have been possible. For example, the lifting of US sanctions on Russia and the return of American energy giants. Is this realistic? I think not, but what does the Kremlin have to lose in attempting this strategy?
The Kremlin appears to be pursuing a rational strategy of preserving its global power reputation by remaining relevant in global conflicts in any way possible and shedding dead weight allies. For example, the Austin Powersque Atlantic Ocean chase of the oil tanker reflagged under the Russian flag. Purpose?
To demonstrate that Russia will confront the US. Another example is the public announcement that it is sending 200,000 barrels of diesel fuel to Cuba with an estimated arrival time in early March. This is a direct challenge to the US de facto oil embargo of Cuba. Will the Kremlin carry through with the shipment?
No Time for Losers
It appears that the Kremlin has also concluded, either willingly or due to limited resources, that it is time to shed non-performing client states. What does this mean? For example, decades of supporting Maduro in Venezuela have left the Kremlin with five in-country joint ventures of questionable value and a political ally now imprisoned in New York. A similar situation played out in Syria and is now unfolding in Cuba. Instead, the Kremlin sees greater value in its alliance with China, Uncle Sam’s closest economic competitor. What other alliances are up for review? One can argue that all of Russia’s alliances are up for review - when money is tight, every ruble counts.
The Kremlin’s situation reminds me of an FSB recruitment story told by a friend who lived in the Russian provinces during the 1990s. He was invited to lunch and offered “a budding friendship over weekly lunches” with the FSB agent. He responded to the shocked FSB recruiter, “I am trying to lose weight and dead-weight friends. Your offer runs counter to my goal.” My friend had the benefit of the protection of the regional governor and local mafia at a time when FSB was very weak.
Oil, Oil, and More Oil
Large oil reserves and a significant share of China’s oil imports are shared characteristics of Iran and Venezuela, and the most rational explanation for the US action against the two countries is to control oil. Together with Russia, the three countries accounted for 38% of China’s crude oil imports in 2025. Russia alone accounted for 20% of China’s crude oil imports.
Given the likelihood that Iranian oil will be off the market, transit through the Strait of Hormuz will be disrupted for weeks, and that Venezuelan oil is also off the market, Russian-sanctioned oil has become more attractive. According to EMOGCP-Russian Oil & Gas Monitor, a well-respected newsletter covering Russian oil & gas, there are currently 130 million barrels (mn bbl) of Russian crude ‘on the water’ and already in Asia. Despite the threat of secondary sanctions, the prevailing $30/bbl discount is expected to narrow to $10/bbl. There is also an expectation that oil prices will rise by $10-$15/bbl when Asian markets open on Sunday. To put this into perspective, the Strait of Hormuz, on average, sees daily transit of 20 mmbpd. If that is also taken off the market for longer than five days, we could see prices increase further, and demand for Russian oil in Asia grow.
Conclusion
Uncle Sam’s global realignment is an opportunity for the Kremlin to reassess the political and economic returns of its alliances. One might argue that all of the Kremlin’s allies are dead weight, but that is not necessarily the case, particularly when one's only option to remain relevant on the global stage is to be a disruptive agent. This is particularly true given the Kremlin’s limited resources, which are consumed by the Russo-Ukrainian War. While Iran was an ally, Russia and Iran also competed for influence in Syria and the greater Middle East. It was an alliance of convenience, founded on a shared anti-Western sentiment. What happens with the relationship depends on the outcome of the US action in Iran. The fog of war has yet to clear.
With Venezuelan and Iranian oil likely off the market and the security status of the Strait of Hormuz uncertain, sanctioned Russian crude oil will be in demand, and the sanctions-driven discount on Russian oil will contract.
On balance, the US-Israeli War on Iran is a geopolitical benefit for Russia because it occupies the US and takes the spotlight off the Russo-Ukrainian War. It also creates demand for sanctioned Russian oil.
For a seasoned analysis of what is happening and what may become of Iran on the other side of this war, I highly recommend reading Hamlet Yousef’s Substack publication from Feb. 28, 2026, listed in Additional Reading(s). Hamlet has shared his thoughts on BWR’s “MT799 Authenticated” independent contributors’ column from time to time, and he does not disappoint.
Additional Reading(s)
Iran: Another Russian Ally on the Cusp of Regime Change (MT799 Authenticated, Babrershop Whispers…Russia’s premier Independent Contributors Column, Contributor Author Hamlet Yousef, 22 Jan 2026)
New World Order - Alliance of the Aggrieved in Disarray (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 07 Dec 2025)
The Kremlin’s High Wire Act: Iranian–Israeli War (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 22 Jun 2025)
China Boosts Russian Oil Purchases – Oligopsony Looms (EMOGCP – Oil & Gas Monitor, Ronald P. Smith, 25 Feb 2026)
The Alliance of the Aggrieved (Part 2) - Russia and Iran (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 30 Jun 2024)
End of the Iranian Regime, and Coming Regime Change (Hamlet Yusef, Substack, 28 Feb 2026)
In Classic Soviet Speak: «On the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran» (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 19 Jan 2025)
The Russia and Middle East Relationship: It’s Complicated (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 15 Oct 2023)
Follow-ups & Quick Bites
Follow-ups
Russian Diesel Fuel Shipment to Cuba Drifting in the Atlantic
The oil tanker Seahorse, carrying 200,000 barrels of Russian diesel fuel and en route to Cuba, has stopped sailing and is now drifting in the Atlantic Ocean, according to Marine Traffic, a live tracking ship website.
During last week’s meeting between Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin pledged to deliver fuel to Havana. If the tanker attempts to deliver the fuel, it will be a direct challenge to the de facto US oil embargo on Cuba, which is in place under a US presidential executive order.
The Cuban economy and living conditions continue to deteriorate, with daily 16-hour blackouts and fuel shortages. The current economic situation has not been seen since the country lost its support from the Soviet Union.
The probability of widespread civil unrest leading to regime change is increasing.
Additional Reading(s)
Russian Oil Tanker Diverts From Cuba as Trump Naval Blockade Deters Shipments (GCapitain, 27 Feb 2026)
Quick Bites
No Quick Bites this week.
Vol 4, No 11 - BWR 01.03.2026
Thank you for reading “Barbershop Whispers....Russia” written by Adam A Blanco! “Barbershop Whispers…Russia” is a product of e8Q Technologies, a consultancy with insights on all things Eurasia. Subscribe for free to receive new posts.
Great article Adam! TY! Love the FSB story!