THE HOLY SYNOD’S BATTLE FOR SOULS
The Third Rome | Resurgence of the Church | Orthodox Schism
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In last week’s BWR, I discussed the curious Trump strategy toward a ceasefire. Trump is pulling out all the stops, even exclusion from the universal 10% liberation tariff.
In this week’s BWR, I will discuss the Russian Orthodox Church and its battle for the people's hearts and minds. As in the time of Peter the Great, the Russian Orthodox Church has a symbiotic relationship with the government.
Takeaways
CHURCH AND STATE—The symbiotic relationship between the Russian government and the church dates to Peter the Great. Stalin used it to ignite the flames of patriotism, and Putin is employing it similarly in his war against the “decadent” liberal West.
The Third Rome
The Great Schism of 1054, when Rome asserted its supreme authority over religious doctrine, marked the beginning of the divide between Eastern and Western Christianity. However, the decisive moment was the sacking of Constantinople by the Western Christian crusaders, which ultimately led to the Ottoman conquest of the city in 1453. It should be noted that the Knights Templar played a role in the sacking of Constantinople, but not a decisive one. Nevertheless, this event has never been forgotten by the Eastern Orthodox churches and serves as the basis for Moscow’s claim to the title of the Third Rome.
Peter the Great, the Russian Tsar to whom President Vladimir Putin compares himself, established the Most Holy Synod, the governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church, in 1721. It served as the highest authority on religious matters and operated under Tsarist control, including the appointment of bishops and the Patriarch.
The Bolsheviks dissolved the Most Holy Synod in 1917, and the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been previously abolished by Peter the Great, was re-established. The Bolsheviks destroyed over 50,000 churches, converted many into museums, and confiscated land. This conversion and confiscation included the Catholic Archdiocese of Russia in Moscow and its parishes in Saratov, Samara, Irkutsk, and throughout Russia.
During the Soviet era, the Russian Orthodox Church, headed by the Patriarchate of Moscow, experienced difficult periods of suppression and resurgence while remaining under strict government control. It was utilized to manage the domestic population and to influence people in regions of Europe that were traditionally Orthodox, particularly the Balkans and Ukraine. It is worth noting that several Catholic churches still operate today in Central Asia, established by Volga River ethnic Germans who were exiled by Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s. Ironically, Stalin can claim responsibility for the spread of Catholicism in Central Asia.
Post-Soviet Era
President Boris Yeltsin Years
The collapse of the Soviet Union fueled a religious resurgence across Russia. In 1990, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) received permission from the Soviet government to restore the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, a landmark church originally built in the 19th century and destroyed by the Bolsheviks in 1931.
President Boris Yeltsin supported the reconstruction of the historical landmark church, partly funded by the government but mostly by various Russian oligarchs. Since the cathedral's reconstruction, private companies such as Transneft, VTB, Gazprom, and Sberbank have also sponsored the construction of new Orthodox churches.
In 1988, the ROC had 8,500 functioning parishes; today, the church has more than 38,500 parishes nationwide.
The early post-Soviet era also saw the revival of non-ROC churches. The Catholic Archdiocese in Moscow, with its parishes in Samara, Saratov, and other regions, was returned to the Vatican. St. George’s Lutheran Church in Samara, established in 1865, was re-established after serving as a warehouse since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. Notably, St. George’s houses one of the largest functioning German organs in Europe.
The return and re-establishment of St. Andrews Anglican Church in Moscow, originally founded in 1723, warranted a visit from Queen Elizabeth II on 19 October 1994. All these churches are operating today, albeit under the wary gaze of the ROC. For instance, in 2000, an acquaintance married a Russian citizen in the Catholic cathedral of Moscow. The bride was required to enroll in 12 months of weekly catechism classes for the ceremony to occur in the cathedral. They were informed that this was a Russian government requirement imposed by the ROC. By the time she completed her classes, she knew more about Catholicism than her groom, who was born into the religion.
Putin Years
Since Putin took office, the relationship between the Russian government and the ROC has become increasingly close and mutually beneficial. For instance, in 2016, Patriarch Kirill, head of the ROC, and Pope Francis met in Cuba. It was the first encounter between a Roman Catholic pope and a Russian Orthodox Patriarch since the Eastern Orthodoxy split with Rome. Before the historic meeting, ROC representatives stated that the papal meeting had finally become possible because the Orthodox Church no longer felt that the Catholic Church was trying to expand its influence in Russia and Ukraine.
At the time, Russian media speculated that Patriarch Kirill’s visit with Pope Francis was a political mission aimed at reducing the country’s isolation due to Western sanctions related to Ukraine. Pope Francis had met with Putin on several occasions and expressed solidarity in opposing Western military intervention in Syria. The Patriarch cultivating the Pope to be sympathetic to the Kremlin’s fight against Western interference in Russia’s near abroad and traditional values was seen as a play for the Global South, where the Pope has influence.
While Patriarch Kirill was preoccupied with the Vatican, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) petitioned the Patriarchate of Constantinople for independence from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Constantinople, known as the symbolic “first among equals” of the world’s Orthodox churches, recognized the UOC in an Orthodox Christmas Eve ceremony in 2019. Ukraine has the third largest population of Orthodox Christians after Russia and Ethiopia, representing a significant loss for the third Rome.
The Levada Center, a Russian-based research center, published a survey indicating an increase in the number of Russians identifying as Orthodox Christians and a growing trust in religious institutions. This resurgence of faith coincides with a rise in nationalist sentiment, the symbiotic relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church's messaging, and the Kremlin’s war against the West. The war is on the battlefield as well as in the hearts and minds of the people.
Conclusion
Since Putin’s second invasion of Ukraine, the symbiotic relationship between Putin and Patriarch Kirill has grown stronger. They are both deeply invested in one another and claim to be the only defenders of traditional values—God, Rodina, and Family.
The ROC plays a powerful role in influencing the public's view on the war.
Additional Reading(s)
Stalin Suppresses the Russian Orthodox Church (EBSCO Davis, Nathaniel 2023)
Russia: A Church-Building Nation Whose Traditionalism Is a Myth (Wilson Center 17 May 2019)
Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill Meet in Havana (The Guardian 12 Feb 2016)
Explainer: The split in Ukraine’s Orthodox Church (Emerging Europe 02 May 2021)
From pulpit to propaganda machine: tracing the Russian Orthodox Church’s role in Putin’s war (Reuters Institute, 09 Feb 2021)
Follow-ups & Quick Bites
Follow-ups
Estonian Navy detains Sanctioned Shadow Fleet Tanker
The Estonian navy detained and boarded a Russia-bound oil tanker on an EU sanctions list on Friday, accusing it of sailing illegally without a valid country flag.
Since February, the Kiwala tanker has been under EU sanctions as part of Russia’s while flying a Djibouti flag, but Djibouti has denied that it was registered there.
Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal said in a post on social media X,
“Early this morning, the Estonian navy detained a sanctioned vessel with no flag state…Estonia takes suspicious activities in the Baltic Sea very seriously,”
Navy ships and helicopters were involved in the operation, and the vessel was being inspected while Estonia talked to Djibouti to confirm details, said Truu.
Several EU countries, Estonia and Denmark in particular, have warned that tankers may be boarded for inspection.
Additional Reading(s)
Estonian Navy Detains Russia-Bound Oil Tanker in Baltic Sea (gCaptain 11 Apr 2025)
Russian Oil Price Cap & New Ecosystem (Barbershop Whispers…Russia 22 Oct 2023)
Gazprom Exits Sixteen-Year Bolivian Investment
Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas giant, has officially exited the Azero gas exploration project in Bolivia.
The Azero project, launched 16 years ago, was to be the pinnacle of Russia’s economic footprint in Latin America. It was billed as a Russia-Bolivia joint venture that would revive Bolivia’s gas production sector, which has been in decline for decades. In 2018, Gazprom pledged $ 1.2B toward the project. However, after 16 years and drilling a record 5,830 meters, no commercially viable gas deposits were found.
While Gazprom is out, Rosatom—Russia’s state nuclear corporation—is in with major contracts, including a $300M research and development center in El Alto. Last September, Bolivia agreed to a $976M venture with Uranium One Group, a Rosatom subsidiary, to establish a lithium carbonate production facility in the Salar de Uyuni, one of the world's largest lithium-bearing salt flats. The Chinese are also invested in the same region, also lured by the abundance of lithium.
Gazprom’s exit can be attributed in part to the high resource demands that Putin’s war is placing on Russian industry.
Additional Reading(s)
Gazprom’s Flare Out (Barbershop Whispers…Russia 23 Jun 2024)
Gazprom abandons Bolivia's Azero project after 16 years of unfulfilled promises (BNE Intellinews (09 Apr 2025)
Quick Bites
General Popov’s Rehabilitation — Off to the Front
Major General Ivan Popov, who commanded Russia’s 58th Combined Arms Army in Ukraine, was arrested in May 2024 on accusations of fraud related to the misappropriation of $1.5M. Popov has appealed to Putin for clemency and that he be returned to his post saying
“I was subjected to unjust prosecution…I wish to continue smashing the enemy [Ukraine] in accordance with the oath I took.”
Popov first made the headlines in July 2023 when he was relieved from his command after criticizing Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for the lack of supplies on the front. When he was relieved of his post, he stated
“I called attention to the main tragedy of modern warfare — a lack of counter-battery fire, a lack of artillery reconnaissance stations and the mass deaths and injuries of our brothers by enemy artillery,”
Popov had strong support from the troops, and his removal sparked outrage among influential pro-war bloggers.
Don’t be surprised if he is rehabilitated and returned to his post as was FSB Colonel General Sergei Beseda and Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. Given the limited pool of experienced officers of known quality, General Sergei Surovikin could be released from his Head of the CIS Coordinating Committee for Air Defense, where he was sent to rot since the Prigozhin revolt in 2023.
Additional Reading(s)
Jailed Army General Appeals to Putin (The Moscow Times 09 Apr 2025)
Colonel General Beseda is Rehabilitated (Barbershop Whispers…Russia 31 Mar 2025)
Who is The Russian Spy Handler, Beseda (The Kyiv Independent 24 Mar 2025)
Vol 3, No 15 - BWR 13.04.2025
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