RUSXIT: Russian Assets in the Western Hemisphere
Eroding Influence | Russian Divestitures | Great Power Protector?
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The New Great Game: Opportunities and Risks
The US, Russia, and China Compete for Resources in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
Save the Date: 29-30 JANUARY 2026: (Discount code BWR10PCT)
On Thursday - Friday (29-30 January 2026), e8Q Technologies and 360 One Firm will host the first of a series of family office conferences on the geopolitical and economic effects of competition among the US, China, and Russia for minerals and influence in South America and the Caribbean (LAC). What are the opportunities and risk mitigation strategies for family offices and other private stakeholders in the region?
The two-day event (29-30 January 2026) will take place at the Miami offices of Cases & Lacambra and is sponsored by Xtellus Partners,, and Cases & Lacambra. The event will feature panelists from global family offices, international banks, and regional companies in Latin America.
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In last week’s BWR, I discussed Russia’s shadow fleet of aging oil tankers, and the curious case of the sanctioned oil tanker Bella One’s Austin Powersque chase across the Atlantic Ocean. Why reflag an oil tanker that is being pursued by US Forces?
In this week’s BWR, I discuss Russia’s economic and political presence in the Western Hemisphere, beginning with assets in Venezuela, Mexico, the US, and Bolivia.
Takeaways
Western Hemispheric Influence—Russia has limited political and economic influence in the Western Hemisphere. The combination of Western sanctions resulting from Russia’s second invasion into Ukraine and the new US National Security Strategy reviving the Monroe Doctrine, has essentially eliminated Russia’s influence in the region. Russian asset sales in the region and the removal of president Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela speak to Russia’s weakened position in the region, and globally. Russia’s reputation as a great power protector to its client states continues to erode.
Eroding Influence
Despite a brief resurgence of Russian influence in the Western Hemisphere in the ’00s, largely driven by high oil prices that filled the Russian treasury, economic and political influence in the region never recovered to the level the Soviet Union wielded. For example, Fidel Castro’s pivot toward the Soviet Union, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Soviet Union’s generous oil-for-sugar subsidies to Cuba illustrate the political and economic power the Soviet Union wielded. Russia did make inroads in establishing relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) by exploiting the leftward pivot of the governments in Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Guyana, and Chile. However, the current political environment in LAC is shifting quickly and sharply to the right. For example, the newly elected Bolivian president, Rodrigo Paz, is a right-of-center politician who will replace nearly two decades of socialist policies.
Many of these LAC countries that are, or were, in the Russian orbit contain Russian investments in mining and energy that are now at risk due to the LAC government’s shift toward the US. The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly states that the US will,
“Deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to win or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.”
Where, and what are these most valuable assets that may be in play as the political landscape shifts toward the US?
Western Hemisphere Divestitures
- Venezuela
The Russia-Venezuela relationship was a post-Soviet product of Russia’s ties to Cuban President Fidel Castro, who was instrumental in bringing Venezuela into the Russian orbit. Castro and Hugo Chávez, the duly elected 1998 Venezuelan president, formed a strong personal bond, often referred to as the Padre-Hermano. This bond began in 1994, when Chávez was released from a Venezuelan prison after leading an attempted coup against the government in 1992. Their deep, shared anti-American ideology was the glue between the men. Castro introduced Chávez to the Kremlin in the early 90s, and from there, Venezuela fell into the Russian orbit of influence. Chávez dismantled Venezuelan democracy and replaced it with Chavismo, a socialist ideology. This cancerous ideology remains in place, despite the recent removal of the illegitimate Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro by US forces and the Venezuelan National Assembly’s promotion of Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, another Chavista, to President. However, while the situation in Venezuela remains uncertain, it appears that the new president, Rodríguez, is cooperating with the US administration. Front and center of this cooperation are favorable terms for a US oil company as it enters the Venezuelan market.
A low-hanging investment opportunity in the chaotic and uncertain Venezuelan market may be the five RosZarubezhneft-PDVSA crude oil production joint ventures in Venezuela. RosZarubezhneft’s estimated book value of these joint ventures is $4 billion, and in each case it holds an interest of 40% or less. However, given the current sanctions regime due to Russian and Venezuelan ownership, and the poor state of the facilities, the effective value is zero. This means that, given the right circumstances – the lifting of sanctions based on a change of ownership and the right financing structure – these assets could be acquired by a Western bank or operator at a fraction of their value compared with their equivalent in a normal market environment. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan country risk factor remains high due to short- and medium-term government uncertainty.
How long will the US effectively govern Venezuela, and what happens after the 2028 US presidential elections? This question was raised by oil executives summoned to the White House by Trump, who were told by Trump that they should commit billions of dollars to rebuild the Venezuelan oil sector.
- Mexico
While Mexico has never really fallen into the Russian sphere of influence, in the world of espionage it has been a permissive and accommodating environment for Cuban and Russian intelligence operatives. Since Soviet times, and to this day, Mexico City is known as the “Vienna of Latin America”, reflecting its status as a sanctuary for intelligence operatives, including the US and Israel.
On the economic front, Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil company, holds a minority stake in major offshore oil fields in Mexico. In 2025, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on both Lukoil and Rosneft. As a result, Lukoil’s western assets, owned through Lukoil International GmbH, have attracted interest from several suitors bidding for all or parts of its global assets. Most recently, Grupo Carso, owned by Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim, announced its interest in acquiring Lukoil’s Fieldwood Mexico subsidiary for $600 million. The deal, pending approval by Mexican and US regulatory authorities, most critically the US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), comprises $270 million in cash and the assumption of $330 million in the subsidiary’s debt.
If the deal is approved, it will serve as a benchmark for pricing and structure of the remaining Lukoil International assets, valued at $22 billion.
- Bolivia
Over the past two decades, Russia has struggled to establish an economic presence in Bolivia. In June 2023, Russia’s state-owned nuclear power corporation, Rosatom, signed agreements with the Bolivian government to invest in several lithium extraction projects. This was followed by a joint-venture agreement between Yacimientos de Litio Boliviano (YLB) and Rosatom’s subsidiary Uranium One Group to establish a $976 million direct lithium extraction (DLE) facility at the Salar de Uyuni lithium flats in Bolivia. However, the agreement still needs to be ratified by the Bolivian Plurinational Legislative Assembly, and the process has been delayed by opposition parties to former President Luis Arce. It appears the deal will be delayed further under the new Bolivian presidential administration of Rodrigo Paz. The new president has stated that he will review all of the mining agreements with Russia and China before they are approved under his leadership.
It should be noted that the Bolivian government’s $1 billion agreement with China’s CBC, a subsidiary of Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. (CATL), the world’s largest lithium battery producer, is also on hold pending ratification by the Bolivian Plurinational Legislative Assembly. Newly elected Bolivian president Paz has also identified this deal as subject to review. The CAC project is the most consequential because it reflects BYD, China’s largest electric car automaker, expansion ambitions in South America. CATL is BYD’s sole battery supplier, and BYD’s market share in South America, particularly in Brazil, has grown significantly.
- North America
Russian mining and steel manufacturer Evraz sold its North American steel mill operations in June 2025 to Atlas Holdings in a $500 million sale, another forced Russian divestiture from Western markets.
Evraz owned and operated three steel mills across North America – the US states of Colorado and Oregon, and the Canadian province of Saskatchewan.
Great Power Protector Status in Question
Russian political and economic influence in the Western Hemisphere continues to decline, a trend accelerated by the Kremlin’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s exit from this region represents billions of dollars in lost markets and influence over traditional allies such as Cuba and Venezuela, and raises questions about its great-power protector status among middle and regional powers worldwide.
Today, the US and China are the remaining global great power protectors with the military and economic reach to effectively influence far-flung regions across the globe, middle powers, and the Global South.
Additional Reading(s)
The Collapsing Venezuela-Cuba Alliance: Where is the Kremlin? (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 14 Dec 2025)
New World Order - Alliance of the Aggrieved in Disarray (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 07 Dec 2025)
RUSXIT Enters Warp Speed Drive – More Russian Assets for Sale (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 16 Nov 2025)
Lukoil’s International Assets and Potential Buyers (Reuters, 16 Jan 2026)
The New Great Game – Russia and China Battle the U.S. for Influence and Resources in Latin America (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 26 Jan 2025)
Russia’s Footprint in Latin America (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 03 Mar 2024)
Follow-ups & Quick Bites
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Vol 4, No 06 - BWR 25.01.2026
Thank you for reading “Barbershop Whispers....Russia” written by Adam A Blanco! “Barbershop Whispers…Russia” is a product of e8Q Technologies, a consultancy with insights on all things Eurasia. Subscribe for free to receive new posts.