Russo-Ukrainian War Peace Negotiations: The Last Mile?
From Abu Dhabi to Miami | Spook Diplomacy | Economic Diplomacy | The Last Mile
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In last week’s BWR, I discussed Russia’s economic and political presence in the Western Hemisphere, beginning with assets in Venezuela, Mexico, the US, and Bolivia.
In this week’s BWR, I discuss the continuing peace negotiations. We have entered the last mile of negotiations, and like a marathon, it is tough.
Takeaways
Diplomacy Process—Two parallel tracks of diplomacy have been active since the Alaska Summit in 2025: Military and Economic. The military track is being used to establish a peace agreement in the Russo-Ukrainian war, while the economic track is focused on normalizing relations between the US and Russia.
Bitter Pills—Territorial concessions are bitter pills for Presidents Zelensky and Putin. The composition of the negotiating teams, intelligence officers rather than diplomats, highlights the complexity of territorial concessions.
The trilateral meeting between Russia, Ukraine, and the US in Abu Dhabi on January 23-24, 2026, marks the first direct face-to-face meeting among the three parties since the Kremlin launched its second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Abu Dhabi meeting was preceded by hours-long negotiations in Moscow on 22 January, among US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov.
The Abu Dhabi meeting, composed primarily of intelligence and military advisors, was followed by a meeting in Miami this weekend – 31 January – between Russian Special Envoy Kirill Dmitriev, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, US Federal Acquisition Service Commissioner Josh Gruenbaum, Witkoff, and Kushner. This suggests that the peace negotiations are continuing along two tracks: military and economic. This dual-track negotiation strategy can be traced back to the US–Russia Alaska Summit, where Dmitriev led a Russian business delegation proposing mining and energy cooperation deals. The economic track is a US-Russia bilateral negotiation that also aims to normalize relations between the two countries. However, as much as the US Administration would like to normalize relations between the US and Russia, any peace agreement will ultimately need to be accepted by Ukraine and, to some degree, by Ukraine’s relatively newfound patron, the EU.
Spook Diplomacy
The composition of intelligence and military advisors in the Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Abu Dhabi – the military track of negotiations – indicates that serious ‘devil in the details’ discussions is underway. The presence of Kyrylo Budanov, recently appointed head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office and former Chief of the armed forces Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), and Russian Admiral Igor Kostyukov, Director of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), is telling. These are two men with intimate knowledge of the battlefield and covert operations, including assassinations.
Budanov is a colorful character and more than 20 years younger than Kostyukov. He is believed to have been CIA-trained and has proven mettle on the battlefield since 2014 and has been an effective psychological operations (PSYOP) practitioner in his former role as HUR chief.
According to Mark Galeotti, a Russian specialist on military and intelligence affairs, little is known about Kostyukov. His intelligence career has straddled analysis at the ‘Aquarium’ (GRU central office in Moscow) and field operations, most recently as the military attaché in Greece. In 2017, he was awarded the gold star, Hero of the Russian Federation, for his role in Syria. According to Galeotti’s piece in the Spectator,
“Kostyukov oversaw GU disruptive operations in Europe… almost certainly being behind the execution of defecting helicopter pilot Maxim Kuzminov in Spain in 2024…”
The presence of the two men indicates that the most difficult last-mile detailed discussions will center on territorial questions/concessions. It’s also a topic only they, not political diplomats, could conduct with authority and confidence. One should not underestimate Russia’s security concerns, whether perceived or genuine, regarding territorial concessions. This will be a bitter pill for both parties to swallow in the name of peace – a just peace, unlikely.
Economic Diplomacy
Dmitriev and Witkoff both expressed optimism on their X channel about their Miami meeting. How exactly it was constructive remains to be seen.
However, the presence of Secretary Bessent at the Miami negotiations is notable, given that he has no Ukraine-Russia remit outside of sanctions. His sanctions responsibility is precisely why he was there.
The Russian economy is under significant stress, with high inflation, labor shortages, and a shrinking non-military economy, all of which are affecting society. More than 43% of the Russian budget is allocated to the Russo-Ukrainian war and internal security demands. The war and Western sanctions are contributing to the deterioration of the Russian economy and the average citizen’s standard of living.
As it stands, the US administration’s sanctions on both Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia’s largest oil producers, mean that nearly 80% of Russian oil production is now subject to Western sanctions. Export revenues from energy sales constitute a significant share of the government’s revenue and are a driver of the economy. Because of the sanctions and the threat of US secondary sanctions, Russian Urals crude trades at a significant discount relative to US Brent. About 50% of Russian crude is delivered using Russia’s aging shadow tanker fleet, of which more than half have reached or are reaching the end of their service life and will need to be replaced.
Another Russian economic priority is the frozen assets, of which more than 70% are held in Europe. The US proposal to use the assets for a US-operated Ukrainian Reconstruction Fund may include the reconstruction of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. This would, de facto, mean the money is returned to Russia, allowing it to economically exploit those territories and forcibly integrate them into Russia.
Aside from Russian priority on territorial concessions being negotiated through the parallel military track, sanctions relief is a Russian economic priority in the peace talks. The Russian frozen assets are a priority in the sense that the Kremlin is using them as leverage and has essentially written them off. This was further evidenced by Putin’s offer to join Trump’s Board of Peace by contributing $1 billion from the Russian frozen assets. To be clear, as of the date of this publication, Putin has not made a decision to join Trump’s Board of Peace.
The Last Mile?
The next round of talks, rumored to be Ukraine-Russia bilateral discussions with the US mediating on the sidelines, is scheduled for 2 February in Abu Dhabi.
It remains to be seen whether a peace agreement will be reached within the next few months; however, serious and genuine efforts by the US, Ukraine, and possibly Russia are underway to achieve it. The composition of the two-track negotiating teams – military and economic – indicates that the negotiations have advanced to the final ‘devil in the details’ stage. Will it be a just peace for Ukraine? Unlikely to be so today or even tomorrow.
Interestingly, the EU’s absence, which I did not discuss in today’s publication, is not present in these negotiations. Western sanctions relief is not a unilateral decision. The EU has its own sanctions regime and packages against Russia, 19 in total, with another to be formally approved at the end of February 2026. Where is the EU, and what leverage do the US and Russia have over the EU to force sanctions relief? It may be that Ukrainian acceptance of a peace deal is enough to motivate the EU to loosen sanctions against Russia.
In the end, the peace negotiations are complex and rightfully emotionally charged.
Additional Reading(s)
Who is the Spook Leading Russia’s Negotiations with Ukraine? (Mark Galeotti X Channel, 23 Jan 2026)
The Alaska Summit - An Evolving Peace Process (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 17 Aug 2025)
An Investment Grade Russia and Peace (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 09 Mar 2025)
Bromancing to Peace? (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 17 Feb 2025)
Root Cause of Putin’s War: Sovereignty and Agency (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 24 Mar 2025)
One Night in Riyadh & Ukrainian Peace (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 24 Feb 2025)
Follow-ups & Quick Bites
Follow-ups
The US Designates Cuba as a Threat to National Security
President Trump signed an executive order declaring a national emergency based on Cuba’s status as a threat to US national security due to the country’s cooperation with states hostile to the US, such as Russia, China, Iran, and Hamas.
The order prohibits the sale of oil to Cuba. Venezuela supplied Cuba with nearly 30% of its crude oil needs. Mexico stepped in after the Venezuelan source of oil was cut off by the extraction of the illegitimate Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Now that the US order is in place, Mexico will no longer deliver oil to the impoverished country. It is estimated that Cuba has approximately 10 to 15 days of oil left before even more severe energy shortages take hold.
Cuba’s economic situation reflects not only decades of poor management and corruption by the Cuban Communist Party but also Russia’s diminished status as a great-power protector in South America and the Caribbean.
The executive order is evidence of the US administration’s implementation of the 2025 US National Security Strategy, which calls for US dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
Additional Reading(s)
The Collapsing Venezuela-Cuba Alliance: Where is the Kremlin? (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 14 Dec 2025)
New World Order - Alliance of the Aggrieved in Disarray (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 07 Dec 2025)
US Carlyle Group Agrees to Buy Lukoil Assets
Lukoil announced that it would sell its foreign assets to the American investment firm Carlyle Group. Lukoil said in a statement that it,
“…signed an agreement with U.S. investment company Carlyle on the sale of LUKOIL International GmbH.”
The pending sale excludes the assets in Kazakhstan and still requires U.S. Treasury approval. In the meantime, Lukoil continues negotiating with other potential suitors for its international assets.
Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim also has a pending purchase of Lukoil’s international assets awaiting review and approval or rejection by the U.S. Treasury. The current OFAC license 131 expires on 28 February 2026. It was originally issued on 14 November 2025 and has since been renewed twice.
Additional Reading(s)
OFAC Issues New and Amended Russia-related General Licenses (Baker McKenzie, 03 Dec 2025)
RUSXIT: Russian Assets in the Western Hemisphere (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 25 January 2025)
Quick Bites
Russia’s Only Anglican Church in a Hostile Takeover
According to the Moscow Times, a power struggle within St. Andrew’s Anglican Church in Moscow came to public view this week after parishioners arriving for Sunday worship were blocked from entering the church by a rival group of members accused of trying to seize control of the congregation.
Founded in the early 19th century, St. Andrew’s is a rare non-Orthodox church in Moscow. Like the two Catholic churches in Moscow, as well as those in Samara and Nizhny Novgorod, it was confiscated by Soviet authorities and converted into museums of natural history.
The confiscated churches were returned to the Anglican Church and the Vatican in 1994 and rebuilt. A close friend and his wife were the third couple to marry in the newly rebuilt Catholic cathedral.
Additional Reading(s)
Moscow’s Only Anglican Church Is Divided, and Headed to Court (The Moscow Times, 30 Jan 2026)
The Holy Synod’s Battle for Souls (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 13 Apr 2025)
Vol 4, No 07 - BWR 01.02.2026
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The dual track approach makes alot of sense when you consider how territorial concessions require military expertise rather than diplomatic platitudes. Intelligence officers like Budanov and Kostyukov understand the ground realities in ways foreign ministers never could. I worked on peacekeeping operations where the biggest obstacle was always bridging that gap between what politicians promis and what security forces could actually deliver.