Dear Subscribers,
“Barbershop Whispers….Russia” begins with “My Takeaways”on the main topic followed by the main topic discussion. The last two sections of “Barbershop Whispers…Russia” will be follow-ups from previous publications and emerging events.
In the previous issue, I discussed the limits of Xi’s “no limits” friendship with Dear Friend Putin as demonstrated by the results of the 10th anniversary Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) forum in Beijing, which Putin attended in late October 2023.
In this week’s issue, I will discuss the Kremlin’s evolving policy towards Palestine, Israel, and the Gaza war. This evolving and perceived pro-Palestinian policy is being projected abroad and internalized at home. The anti-Israeli mob riot in the Dagestani airport is evidence of this domestic internalization of the Kremlin’s evolving policy towards Palestine and Israel.
My Takeaways:
ALLIANCES: Putin is presenting himself as the arbitrator to all parties of the Gaza war. Israel is now pre-occupied with Gaza, increasing the likelihood it will remain neutral in Putin’s war on Ukraine. Putin believes Iran, the Arab world, and the global south, which oppose the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the war are closely aligned with Russia’s overall geopolitical interests;
INDECISION: The rigid, vertical nature of decision-making at all levels of government results in government paralysis. Unless it is clear Putin is in favor of an action, either through a presidential order or tacit, informal approval – for example, a crackdown on anti-war or anti-Putin protests – government officials will not act unless they receive orders from the Kremlin to act;
POPULIST NARRATIVE: Putin is exploiting the shared sentiment of perceived Western arrogance to align and mobilize the non-aligned states with the Kremlin’s geo-political interests. The Israeli war on Gaza, supported primarily by the US-led West, is repackaged as the Soviet-era narrative of proletarian struggle against greedy western colonizers and capitalists.
Background
In the 15 October issue of BWR “The Russia and Middle East Relationship: It’s Complicated” I discussed the delicate tightrope Putin was walking after the Hamas massacre in managing his relationships – with Israel, Iran, and the Arab world – and Russian neutrality. Putin’s Middle East policy is a classic example of “sitting on three chairs at the same time”: depending on Iranian Shaheed drones to prosecute the war in Ukraine, keeping Israel neutral in that war, and relying on the Arab world (the UAE in particular) as a linchpin in the new economic ecosystem (BWR issue 22 October) that enables the evasion of sanctions.
On 16 October, Putin called Netanyahu and offered his condolences for the families killed in the Hamas massacre and briefed him on his discussions with leaders of countries in the region – Syria, Palestinian Authority, Egypt, and Iran.
Russia’s multi-ethnic makeup should also be noted, as these ethnic minorities play a role in Russian geopolitics and domestic policy. Approximately 11% of Russia’s 142M people identify as Muslim, and they are located primarily in the north Caucasus – Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, etc. Other Muslim pockets include the prosperous autonomus Republics of Tatarstan and Bashkiria. Similarly, 11% of soldiers in the Russian military also identify as Muslim. And a significant percentage of new military conscripts are recruited from ethnic minority regions such as the north Caucasus. Meanwhile Russia’s Jewish population, while concentrated in Moscow, is influential in Russian and Israeli politics and business — Russian speakers make up approximately 15% of the Israeli population.
Dagestan is one of the poorest regions of Russia with a growing population due to a high birth rate, high youth unemployment (16%), and 80% of its government budget is funded from the Russian federal budget.
Russian Middle East Policy & Gaza:
Foreign Policy & Gaza
Kremlin Hosts Hamas and Iran:
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov hosted Iranian diplomat Ali Bagheri Kani and Hamas representative Moussa Abu Marzouk in the Kremlin last week (26 October) for discussions on the war in Gaza.
![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F05122404-f644-4932-a973-a35ee4ea3bd3.heic)
In the meeting, Bogdanov promoted a cease-fire, the lifting of the blockade on Gaza, and providing humanitarian assistance, according to a statement by the Iranian Embassy in Moscow. Russian news channels aired the Iranian statement, conveying the message to the Russian public that Russia is an important arbitrator in the Middle East conflict.
The meeting with Hamas and the Iranian envoy was condemned by Israeli foreign ministry spokesman Lior Haiat:
“Hamas is a terrorist organization worse than ISIS… the hands of senior Hamas officials are stained with the blood of over 1,400 Israelis who were slaughtered… and the kidnapping of over 220 Israelis”
At the UN General Assembly session last week, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya stated:
“Israel has no right to self-defense against Hamas militants in Gaza as an occupying power in Palestine…The only thing [the West] can muster is continued pronouncements about Israel’s supposed right to self-defense. Although, as an occupying power, it does not have that power.”
Domestic Policy & Gaza
Trouble in the Russian North Caucasus:
Russia’s North Caucasus, inhabited mostly by Sunni Muslims, has been a source of turbulence for Russia for centuries. Moscow launched two wars against Chechen separatists in the late 90s and early 00s. The last war played a significant role in Putin’s ascension to power and later resulted in Ramzan Kadyrov’s appointment to the Chechen presidency after his father was assassinated in 2007. Most recently, in September 2022 several hundred women gathered and protested in Makhachkala the mobilization of their husbands and children chanting:
“No to war!….No to mobilization….Our children are not fertilizer!”
Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria also form important components of the region.
This past week a mob of 2,000 people stormed the airport in the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala, searching for Israelis allegedly arriving on a flight from Israel. The local authorities’ reaction to the mob that made its way onto the tarmac and to the plane was strikingly slow. Rosgvardiya (Russian National Guard) arrived only several hours after the mob had overrun the airport.
The Head of Dagestan, Sergei Melikov, addressed the events late at night, with a statement condemning the riots but yet sympathetic with the rioters. Other incidents of anti-Semitic protests and actions took place across the North Caucasus. For example, a Jewish center in the Russian republic of Kabardino-Balkaria was set on fire and a hotel was swarmed by a mob searching for Israelis.
Government officials’ hesitation to act recalls the indecision seen during Prigozhin’s “March for Justice”. They did not know what to do, because they did not have orders from the center, or from Putin himself. The decision-making process under Putin resembles the Soviet system: you will likely be punished simply for taking initiative, regardless of whether your action was right or not.
The Dagestani airport riot did not explicitly constitute an anti-government protest and was made up of non-political civilians. In fact, the protests aligned with the government’s position opposing the Israeli war on Gaza, as projected at home and abroad. Had the mob been an anti-war or anti-Putin protest, Rosgvardiya would have immediately crushed the rioting mob with batons.
![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcd8ce1c8-0f3f-4e7b-bf40-edb5fe510c1f.heic)
The soft and delayed action in Dagestan contrasts with what Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen president, instructed his interior ministry and national guard to do, should anyone take to the streets:
“Detain them…Otherwise, make three warning shots in the air, and if the person doesn’t obey the law afterward, make the fourth shot in the forehead…No one else will come out [to protest]. This is my order.”
The Kremlin has blamed western provocateurs for instigating the riots, pointing to a Telegram channel “Morning Dagestan” (‘Morning Dagestan’ has since been removed from Telegram) as the source of the information that Israeli refugees to be housed in Dagestan would be on the flight arriving in Makhachkala and people should meet the plane as “adults”. ‘Morning Dagestan’ has links to Ilya Ponomarev, a Russian opposition politician now residing in Ukraine and with ties to the National Republican Army (NRA), an alleged partisan group working toward the violent overthrow of the Putin government. In Ukraine, Ponomarev established anti-Putin media platforms, broadcasting anti-Putin information for Russian consumption.
The spontaneous cause of the riots runs much deeper than insignificant messages on Telegram channels and non-existent western provocateurs. Poverty and unemployment runs high in Dagestan and their own underlying feelings as second-class Russian citizens gives them reason to empathize with the Palestinians and their relationship with Israel.
Conclusion:
Putin is seizing the opportunity created by the Hamas massacre and the Israeli invasion of Gaza to advance Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Middle East and with the global South. Iranian, Arab, and global South protests over the Israeli invasion of Gaza align with Russia’s interests and with the Kremlin’s narrative of global Western colonization. This narrative is messaged in Africa and manifests itself in Kremlin support for coups in the Sahel. Elsewhere, note how Bolivia severed diplomatic ties with Israel, and both Colombia and Venezuela recalled their ambassadors from Tel Aviv for consultations.
Russia is capitalizing on the anti-Western sentiments it shares with non-Western states such as Iran, China, Syria, and the global South, by promoting populist ideals that undermine western interests and advance Russia’s geopolitical image as the “protector of the oppressed”. This is a classic, repackaged Soviet-era propaganda strategy — the struggle of the proletariat against the greedy capitalist West, led by Uncle Sam.
Not covered in this issue of BWR is Kadyrov role as the Kremlin’s cornerstone of peace and stability in the North Caucasus and the heavy price the Kremlin pays for it - money and autonomy. However, the slow action by local Dagestani authorities to quell the airport riot is a reflection of the weak control the Kremlin has over the North Caucasus. A riot, of any sort, would not happen in Chechnya as long as Kadyrov is in place. His absence could very well ignite separatist movements in the North Caucasus again.
Follow-ups & Quick Bites:
Follow-Ups:
“No Limits” Limits of the Putin and Xi Friendship
The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) reported that Putin and Xi agreed to increase Russian agricultural exports to China to $25B over the next 12 years.
As discussed in the BWR 22 July issue “Ukraine – Breadbasket of the World in Forced Closure", China was the biggest beneficiary of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) when the program was in place.
While this is not the Power of Siberia 2 agreement Putin wanted out of the Belt & Road forum, it is more tangible than the pomp and circumstance he received at the time.
Quick Bites:
US Treasury issues 130 Sanctions on Individuals and Entities
U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued more than 100 sanctions against individuals and entities domiciles in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (the UAE). As per Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen:
“Our global sanctions coalition has choked off Russia’s access to key inputs for its military industrial complex and has undermined the Kremlin’s ability to wage its unprovoked war. Today’s actions demonstrate our further resolve in continuing to disrupt every link of Russian military supply chain, and target outside actors who would seek to support Russia’s war effort.”
Notable in the recent sanctions list is ARX Financial Engineering Limited (ARX), a UAE-based financial engineering institution that provided brokerage and investment services to institutional clients which included the ability to transfer Russian financial assets into and house brokerage and bank accounts in the UAE. ARX was able to convert Russian rubles sent from sanctioned Russian bank VTB Bank into USD.
Vol 1, No 18 - BWR 05.11.2023
Thank you for reading “Barbershop Whispers....Russia” written by Adam A Blanco! “Barbershop Whispers…Russia” is a product of e8Q Technologies, a consultancy with insights on all things Eurasia. Subscribe for free to receive new posts.