Mr. Rodríguez Goes to Moscow: Realpolitik vs Idealism
Russian Political Assets in Play | Mr. Rodríguez Goes to Moscow | Raúlito to Lead Cuba?
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In last week’s BWR, I discussed the expiration of the New START Treaty and the emerging Chinese nuclear force. Why was it allowed to expire, and are we on the cusp of a new nuclear arms race?
In this week’s BWR, I discuss the Kremlin’s response to the US pressure on Cuba. Given the demands of the Russo-Ukrainian war, does the Kremlin have the resources to keep its client states in the Americas?
Takeaways
Political Assets—Russia will lose its influence over its legacy client state, Cuba. The US is likely to apply elements of the Venezuela operation to Cuba, a regime change playbook in the proof of concept stage, and there is very little the Kremlin can do to stop it.
Pragmatism—The Kremlin has limited resources given the demands of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua are costly political assets with questionable returns. The Kremlin will seek to retain influence in its client states in the Western Hemisphere, but will not jeopardize its goal of subjugating Ukraine in doing so.
The Kremlin’s Political Assets in Play
In recent BWR publications, I have discussed Moscow’s weak response to the early-morning U.S. military extraction of the illegitimate Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, from his home in Caracas, as well as Cuba’s collapsing economy. Both Russian client states are in a fluid state of economic and political change. What can the Kremlin do to help them?
I also discussed the ‘Comrade in Arms’ bond between Venezuela and Cuba, established in the late 90s through the deep personal relationship between the late Cuban President Fidel Castro and the late Venezuelan Hugo Chavez. This mutually dependent security and economic relationship between the two governments was driven by two realities: 1. Shared anti-American sentiment, and 2. Russia’s disinterest and/or inability to provide the security and economic support to them.
For example, Cuba’s intelligence and security influence in keeping the Chavist government afloat was evident in the killing of 32 Cuban special forces – Avispas Negras (Black Wasps) - officers during the US military extraction of Maduro in early January. In exchange for these security services, Venezuela has delivered discounted oil products for decades. Without this energy, the Cuban economy would have collapsed long ago, and without Cuban intelligence, Maduro may have been ousted during the 2019 civil unrest in Venezuela.
Since Maduro’s extraction, and in collaboration with the newly appointed Chavist Venezuelan president, Delcy Rodriguez, the US has taken control of Venezuela’s oil export revenues and imposed a de facto oil blockade on Cuba.
In January, US President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) – “Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenues for the American and Venezuelan People” – authorizing the US government to control proceeds from US-arranged Venezuelan oil sales and barring creditors from seizing those proceeds. The revenue from these sales is deposited into a US government account in Qatar and the US Treasury. Notably, the US action has created a thriving arbitrage opportunity for commodities traders familiar with OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) licenses No. 5U and 46A, governing Transactions Related to the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) 2020 bonds and Activities Involving Venezuelan-Origin Oil, respectively. In short, the US is controlling Venezuela’s export oil revenue cash flows and government expenditures.
On January 29, 2026, Trump issued an EO declaring Cuba a US security threat under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). By citing IEEPA, the US administration can levy tariffs on goods from countries that sell or provide oil to Cuba. The specific security threat cited in the US presidential EO is Russian and Chinese signal intelligence (SIGNT) posts located on the island.
It should be noted that Russian SIGNT posts also exist in Nicaragua. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and his Vice President and wife, Rosario Murillo, may want to get ahead of this situation because they are next. They may want to secure their Moscow flat, or they may end up sharing a prison cell with Maduro.
Mr. Rodríguez Goes to Moscow
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla visited the Kremlin last week and met with senior Russian government officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian President Vladimir Putin. During the meetings, Putin expressed support for Cuba and condemned the US action against Cuba, stating,
“We have always stood by Cuba in its fight for independence and the right to choose its own path of development, and we have always supported the Cuban people…this is a special period with sanctions…and it is unacceptable.”
According to Bloomberg, a US-sanctioned oil tanker named Seahorse, carrying 200,000 barrels of Russian-origin diesel, has set sail from off the coast of Cyprus and is expected to arrive in Havana by early March. The last oil shipment to Cuba came from Mexico in early February. Since the US presidential EO was issued, Mexico has suspended oil shipments to Cuba.
The Seahorse fuel shipment could pose a direct challenge to the US oil embargo on Cuba, but uncertainties surrounding it allow for off-ramps that could avoid such a challenge. For example, it is a Cameroonian-flagged tanker, and based on publicly available information, ownership of the fuel is unclear. However, the Russian Embassy in Havana implicitly claimed ownership of the shipment by announcing it as ‘humanitarian aid’ from Russia. If the shipment does arrive to Havana, it would be the first fuel shipment from Russia since February 2025.
Raúlito Castro?
In parallel to Mr. Rodríguez’s Moscow visit, the Cuban government appears to be taking other steps to lessen the tension between Cuba and the US. Credible rumors circulating in Washington, D.C., as well as Russian nationalist Telegram channels, that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been in discussions with Raúl Castro’s grandson, Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro – Raúlito. The 41-year-old Castro heir is a lieutenant colonel in the Ministry of Interior (MININT), and his father was the late Major General Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja, president of the military conglomerate Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), which essentially controls the 80% of the Cuban economy, including tourism and remittances to the island. Secondly, reports indicate that Cuban intelligence has been withdrawingfrom Venezuela.
Conclusion
Like the American comedy movie “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington,” Mr. Rodríguez is confronting the real world – one in which realpolitik supersedes idealism.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, the political and economic return on its Western Hemisphere assets – Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela – is questionable given the resource demands of the war in Ukraine. This is complemented by a rare situation in which Putin believes he shares a realpolitik worldview with a US president, who is also motivated to normalize relations with Russia as an equal on the world stage.
The US Maduro extraction, while maintaining the Chavist government in place, serves as a pilot regime-change template that may apply to Cuba as well as Nicaragua. It is a US-managed political transition, with the optionality of boots on the ground, that may appeal to those in the Cuban regime, as it did to Venezuela’s then Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, to collaborate with the US. Could we see a similar situation play out in Cuba, where Raúlito is the US and Cuban-government anointed leader?
It is possible that such collaboration with Cuba had been in the works prior to Maduro’s extraction. It should be noted that ‘elements of the Cuban regime had reached out to Washington, DC, to explore what the region would look like without Maduro.’ Furthermore, Cuba had also made it clear to Maduro that it was not going to war with the US, nor was exile for him in Havana an option should the US invade Venezuela.
What does this mean for the Kremlin? It means the loss of its client states, but the Kremlin will nevertheless work in a cost-effective manner to stay in the game and retain leverage in those states, regardless of who is in charge.
Additional Reading(s)
The US Controlling Venezuela’s Oil Cash (Politico, 22 Jan 2026)
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Arrives in Moscow (CiberCuba, 18 Feb 2026)
Cuban Foreign Minister Meets with President Putin (CberCuba, 22 Feb 2026)
New Executive Order Opens Door to Tarrifs Countries Selling or Supplying Cuba with Oil (Holland & Knight, 02 Feb 2026)
Rubio’s Secret Squeeze on Raúl Castro’s Cuba (Axios, 18 Feb 2026)
New World Order – Alliance of the Aggrieved in Dissaray (BWR, 07 Dec 2025)
The Collapsing Venezuela – Cuba Alliance: Where is the Kremlin? (BWR, 14 Dec 2025)
Our Men in Havana – Sergei Lavrov and Boris Titov (BWR, 14 Apr 2024)
Follow-ups & Quick Bites
Follow-ups
Russo-Ukrainian War Discussions in Genève
The last mile is the hardest, as the latest round of peace negotiations in Geneva demonstrated.
Ukrainian and Russian officials wrapped up the latest round of U.S.-mediated peace talks after a second day of discussions that lasted just two hours. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told reporters on social media that “the negotiations were not easy.” He noted that while the two sides had essentially reached an agreement on technical issues, such as how to monitor a cease-fire, they remained far apart on political issues, including the fate of Ukrainian-held territory in the east of the country that Russia wants as a price for ending the war.
Additional Reading(s)
Second day of Talks Ends After Just two-Hours (NYT, 18 Feb 2026)
Russo-Ukrainian War Negotiations: The Last Mile? (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 01 Feb 2026)
Quick Bites
Russia Decoded - We Watch the Russian News so You Don’t Have To
From time to time, I come across weekly podcasts and publications I believe worthy of my fellow Barbers and Shoeshiners, and Russia Decoded is one of them.
Russia Decoded is a weekly podcast hosted by Andy Kuchins, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest and adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Chris Monday, a professor of economics at Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea. These two seasoned Russia hands watch the weekly Sunday evening Russian program, Vesti Nedeli (“News of the Week”) and deliver an engaging analysis of the broadcast on Tuesday morning. Their discussion is informative, entertaining, and a breath of fresh air for understanding Russia.
Well done, Andy and Chris, although I must say that, for those who have the time, watching Vesti Nedeli can almost be as entertaining as listening to these gentlemen analyze and discuss the broadcast.
Additional Links
Vol 4, No 10 - BWR 22.02.2026
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