From Poland With Love - Venezuelan and Cuban Economic Reforms
MT799 Authenticated | Independent Contributors Column
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As the political landscape in Latin America shifts towards capitalism and the US projects its power over the region, as demonstrated by the intensifying Cuban Venezuelan Missile Crisis, the possibility of political and economic reforms in Venezuela and Cuba may become a reality after decades of oppression and poverty in the two countries.
In this spirit economic reforms, I asked Dr. Mariusz-Jan Radło, Professor of Economics at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics (Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie), and founder and managing partner of SEENDICO, a Warsaw-based strategic advisory firm, to share his thoughts on Polish lessons of economic reforms that may have application in Venezuela and Cuba when the time comes.
For investors and companies working in fragile or uneven markets, one lesson is clear: power comes from structure. In today’s unstable world, the real question is no longer how to avoid interdependence, but how to use it — to build leverage, resilience, and long-term strength in a volatile global environment.
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The recent Florida International University 2025 Latin America Country Risk Index (LACRI) gave me a strong sense of déjà vu. The political swings, weak institutions, and eroding trust in government reported by some Latin American countries echo what I once observed and experienced in post-Soviet occupied Eastern Europe. Some of these countries face political, economic, and structural challenges.
In my work as an academic and economic development advisor, I view sovereign states not just as market players but as strategic actors operating within an asymmetric interdependent world. No state can completely escape economic dependency; we live in an interdependent global world. What they can do is transform economic dependency from a weakness into a source of strength and strategic power.
Realistic Lens
In some Latin American countries, the LACRI report identifies the visible signs of crisis: a deficit of public trust in government, weak governance, organized crime, and social polarization. These issues exist in the US and Europe, to varying degrees. However, beneath these symptoms lies a deeper issue: the country’s position within the global hierarchy of economic power.
Many Latin American states face struggles not only because of internal weaknesses but also because they are partly governed by external influences—through diaspora, foreign capital and technology, and infrastructure.
When government institutions lose the people’s trust, informal networks will fill the trust void. In parts of the region, criminal or hybrid actors control flows of money, territory, and logistics, mimicking—in a distorted way—the functions of statecraft: extracting rents, managing supply routes, and enforcing order. Their rise reflects not ideology, but the erosion of the state’s ability to govern. For example, there are regions of Mexico and Colombia that are effectively controlled by drug cartels. In 2019, Mexican security forces arrested Ovidio Guzmán López, the son of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, and were later forced to release him because the Sinaloa cartel had seized the town, threatening a bloodbath if he was not released.
The government’s inability to govern and provide security impacts foreign direct investments and nearshoring investment decisions. In some Latin American countries, non-state actors are perceived by the public as more reliable providers of security and economic opportunity than their federal governments.
This institutional vacuum does not emerge in isolation. When states lose the capacity to deliver order and growth, ideology often steps in to fill the gap — offering narratives rather than solutions. Nowhere is this more visible than in Cuba and Venezuela.
Ideological Trap
Cuba and Venezuela remain caught between two recurring narratives:
Economic romanticism - The promise of justice without competitiveness.
Defensive populism- Autonomy without the institutional capacity to sustain it.
Both narratives are removed from the reality of the region in which they live and global economics. Instead of fostering economic resilience, they often reinforce their dependence on external financial, technological, and political centers of power. In the case of Venezuela and Cuba, the dependence was on Russia, China, Iran, and each other.
Cuba is a good illustration of this dynamic. The rise of state-linked conglomerates, particularly Grupo de Administración Empresarial, S.A. (GAESA), reflects the concentration of economic power at the expense of the state and the people. GAESA controls Cuban tourism, logistics, ports, and hard-currency flows and is a highly centralized, opaque system that benefits the Cuban military elite, not the country.
Venezuela has evolved into a similar structure, with political and security elites controlling key economic sectors, especially oil. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the Venezuelan state-owned oil company, has been central to funding the Maduro and Chávez regimes for the past two decades.
In both cases, Cuba and Venezuela, ideology substitutes for markets and national interests. Their appeals to sovereignty or to justice against imperialism are used to mask economic policy failures and corruption.
Models of Transformational Integration
Looking back at Poland in the early 1990s, I see familiar challenges facing Venezuela and Cuba: a fragile economy, an absence of institutions, and dependence on an external power - the Soviet Union and COMCON. Sudden exposure to global competition causes the dependent system to collapse.
Poland’s response was strategic anchoring—deliberate integration with Western institutions. For Poland, this meant integration with German/European industry networks — a form of externally anchored industrial transformation that initially created dependence but ultimately provided the platform for upgrading and model evolution — supported further by reliance on the global Polish diaspora, both in Europe and the United States. This anchoring tied domestic reforms to an external rules-based system that delivered disciplined political and industrial policy, unleashed entrepreneurs, sparked industrial retooling, and retained labor.
While Poland’s path to reform was successful, it is not the only successful path pursued by countries undergoing economic and political reform. It should be noted that Vietnam chose a different reform path from Poland, which was strategic and effective. It is a process. I define it as selective absorption. The targeted opening of specific sectors to foreign capital and technology to build capabilities, facilitate technology transfer, and lay the foundation for future domestic manufacturing growth.
Vietnam opened its economy to specific sectors, using foreign investment to capture technology transfers and convert its external dependence into a domestic tool for growth. Local content rules, joint ventures, and controlled market access have turned external economic integration into a structured learning process, with supply chains that now accommodate local industry and domestic investors.
Vietnam’s relationship with Samsung-led electronics cluster, initially a symbol of dependence on a single multinational, is a case in point. It became a catalyst for the creation of new supply chains, the development of labor skills, and the emergence of a robust broader industrial ecosystem.
Venezuelan and Cuban Dilemma
Cuba and Venezuela have yet to implement any economic reforms or global integration. They are guided by a defensive notion of autonomy and a revolutionary ideology that prioritizes political sovereignty over economics, and they remain outside of the mainstream global economy. They remain dependent on their decades-long external patrons – Russia, China, Iran, and the exiled diaspora in the US and Europe.
The dilemma is clear: political reform is a prerequisite for any credible economic reform. Existing institutions are embedded in rigid ideological narratives that prioritize political preservation over economic performance. As long as these structures remain intact, they will continue to obstruct the emergence of market institutions and disable the mechanisms required for growth and investment.
Recognizing this institutional barrier is essential because it defines the starting point for any realistic reform strategy.
Realistic Pathways for Cuba and Venezuela
Any discussion of economic anchoring in Cuba or Venezuela must start with a difficult truth: Political reform must take place first. The Marxist models adopted by both regimes have delivered equality in poverty, perpetual stagnation, shortages, and elite control over resources, and cannot be rehabilitated.
Once political reform takes place, anchoring is achievable with the most reliable source of capital and managerial talent coming from the Florida-based diaspora. Permitting diaspora investment under transparent regulations, eliminating GAESA’s monopoly, and reconnecting key sectors like services, logistics, and agro-processing to regional and global networks would create initial pathways for progress.
Anchoring, therefore, requires a shift from ideological alliances toward rule-based, growth-focused frameworks. Institutions such as the Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina y el Caribe (CAF), the Inter-American Development Bank, and other multilateral financial institutions could offer transparency and performance-linked financing to eliminate the extractive force of GAESA.
Also, geography should be exploited. Cuba and Venezuela are within the US sphere of influence, limiting autonomy, but the flip side is endless access to technology and business opportunities.
Summary & Takeaway
I have examined how Poland’s post-socialist transformation might inform Cuba’s future trajectory. In both cases, as in Poland and Vietnam, political reform must precede any credible economic reform. Whether the final route follows “selective absorption à la Vietnam” or full institutional anchoring like Poland remains an open question — one that will be determined by political conditions, institutional capacity, and the role of the diaspora.
The collapse of state-controlled economic systems in Eastern Europe has already shown what happens when political reform lags economic needs. The lesson is clear: preparation must begin before the moment of transition arrives, because when the opportunity emerges, it will come quickly — and without warning.
Addtional Reading(s)
The Trump - Maduro Face Off (Babershop Whispers…Russia MT799 Authenticated, Keenthe Dekleva, 26 Nov 2025)
Venezuela - First Russian Domino to Fall in the Americas (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 30 Nov 2025)
The Latin America Country Risk Index (Florida International University, Oct 2025)
CubanVenezuelan Missile Crisis - A Kremlin Problem (Barbershop Whispers…Russia, 02 Nov 2025)
Vol 2, No 51 - BWR (MT799) 03.12.2025
Thank you for reading “Barbershop Whispers....Russia” written by Adam A Blanco! “Barbershop Whispers…Russia” is a product of e8Q Technologies, a consultancy with insights on all things Eurasia. Subscribe for free to receive new posts.
Radlo's framing of the anchoring versus selective absortion dichotomy is brilliant. He captures how Latin American states must transform dependency from weakness into structural strength, yet the article reveals the deeper paradox: both Poland and Vietnam required political reform first, not just economic rethinking. The real tension lies in timing - when institutional capacity is weakest is preciesely when reform windows open most briefly. For Venezuela and Cuba especially, the diaspora capital he mentions could catalyze change, but it depends entirely on whether elites will accept external accountability mechanisims.